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Abstract
The present study develops a formal model on the rationale and effectiveness of
verifiable information transmission - the core characteristic of confidence-building
measures (CBMs). CBMs have received high attention in the case study literature
and day-to-day political business, yet are largely neglected in formal literature.
This is surprising given that the desirability and peace-inducing effects of CBMs
are debated. The formal model shows that by unilaterally or bilaterally increas-
ing the amount of verifiable information concerning military aspects, CBMs may
increase the parties’ expected payoffs and eliminate the risk of war. By offering a
solution to the renowned information problem in crisis bargaining, without resort-
ing to domestic audiences or third parties, this study also contributes to the crisis
bargaining literature.
1 Introduction
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have greatly proliferated since first being estab-
lished by the United States and Soviet Union and the members of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during the Cold War. Despite sometimes
falling short of their goal, CBMs are primarily intended to credibly increase military
information between states in order to prevent wars occurring due to misunderstand-
ing and miscalculation (Alford 1981; Desjardins 1996; Lachowski 2005). While the first
Helsinki CSCE approach to CBMs proved unsuccessful owing to missing verification pro-
cedures (Alford 1981, 137; Desjardins 1996, 16), later attempts in the Stockholm and
Vienna Documents provided for the extensive verification of military information and
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represented a success story (Lachowski 2005, 13).1 Over the years, OSCE members have
agreed both multilaterally and bilaterally to diverse modes of transmitting verifiable in-
formation, including the mutual observation of military manoeuvers, on-site inspections
and aerial surveillance (Lachowski 2005). Outside the OSCE, Argentina and Brazil are
among the most ardent proponents of CBMs. In 1990, both states agreed to establish the
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),
with the goal of verifying both states’ use of all nuclear materials and facilities exclusively
for peaceful purposes. In practice, the agreement has led to a joint inspection mechanism
through which Argentinian nationals inspect Brazilian nuclear facilities, and vice versa,
in order to mutually assure peaceful intentions (Redick 1999, 233). Other state dyads
in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa have followed a similar path, albeit often with less
ambitions and success (Krepon 1999).
Why do states agree to share verifiable information about military aspects? Do they
benefit from this undertaking; moreover, does it reduce the risk of war?2 This study’s
main idea is as follows: the concern leading to verifiable information transmission in the
first place is that war might arise due to misunderstanding and miscalculation. Military
actions are seen as inherently ambiguous, and thus can easily be misinterpreted: ”A
routine military training exercise, for instance, can be mistaken by another state as an
offensive action and trigger an undesirable reaction, leading to unintended conflict” (Des-
jardins 1996, 21). Likewise, a harmless reconnaissance flight or naval deployments can be
mistaken as an act of aggression. Similarly, military rhetoric that serves mere domestic
purposes yet has little substance as a real danger can trigger a hostile response. In all such
cases, uncertainty about the other’s actual military capabilities and intentions can bring
about military escalation. When allowing for CBMs in the form of external observers
monitoring troop movements, inspecting weapon arsenals or observing nuclear facilities,
the hope is that ambiguity is reduced. Observers receive informative signals about a
potentially hostile state’s true intentions, and despite this information not being perfect,
it helps states to update their beliefs about each other’s intentions and better assess the
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situation in place, which should subsequently lead to a risk reduction of accidental war.3
In order to capture this idea formally, the present study incorporates verifiable in-
formation transmission into a standard take-it-or-leave-it crisis bargaining model with
uncertainty concerning war payoffs. This standard model depicts a bargaining situation
between one state, the owner of a contested good, and another, a potential challenger
who threatens to fight a war over the contested good. The owner makes an offer, which
the challenger can accept or reject, with rejection resulting in ex-post inefficient war. Un-
certainty concerning war payoffs leads to a risk-return–tradeoff with the owner sometimes
making a low offer that a strong challenger rejects. In order to model the transmission
of verifiable information, this study adds a pre-negotiation phase to the standard crisis
bargaining model, in which the states, who do not yet know their own expected war
payoffs, can commit themselves to the later revelation of a random variable, the value of
which correlates with the uncertain war payoff. Upon learning the value of the random
variable, the states update their belief about the other’s type. For example, if the chal-
lenger commits itself to sharing verifiable information about its military budget, troop
size or nuclear program, the owner of the contested good can better assert whether it
faces a strong or weak challenger. This assertion subsequently helps the owner to make
a more appropriate offer, which the challenger rejects with less frequency. Consequently,
the prevention of war generates a surplus that can be potentially divided by the states.
While CBMs can be concluded unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, this study fo-
cuses only on unilateral and bilateral CBMs.4 Although multilateral CBMs clearly merit
attention, unilateral and bilateral CBMs are more interesting theoretically, because they
are deemed effective absent an external information generating or enforcement mech-
anism. The present study determines the conditions for no, unilateral, and bilateral
verifiable information transmission to hold. It predicts that no information transmission
occurs if the challenging state is likely to be strong irrespective of the other state’s type;
that unilateral information transmission occurs if the challenging state is likely to be
weak and its opponent is likely to be strong; and that bilateral information transmission
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occurs if both states are likely to be weak. Under the model’s assumptions, it also shows
that both unilateral and bilateral information transmission reduce the risk of war to zero.
That said, this study provides a formal backing to the often empirically assumed rationale
and effectiveness of confidence-building measures. Simultaneously, the study meaning-
fully extends the standard take-it-or-leave-it crisis bargaining model in that it offers a
solution to the information problem without relaxing the unitary actor assumption or
introducing third parties.
The following section introduces confidence-building measures in general and verifi-
able information transmission in particular. Section 3 holds that verifiable information
transmission is best analyzed as a solution to the information problem in a crisis bar-
gaining model, thus complementing other possible solutions to the information problem.
Section 4 presents the theoretical model. Section 5 discusses the model’s implications
and assumptions, and section 6 concludes.
2 Verifiable Information Transmission
The term confidence-building measures dates back to the early days of the Cold War,
when the United States and Soviet Union agreed on a hotline and other measures of
consultation and notification following the Cuban Missile Crisis, in order “to create more
reliable communication channels for the exchange of information, particularly following
unforeseen incidents or accidents” (Fisher 1999, 296; Krepon 1999, 1ff.). These initial
steps were followed by more far-reaching measures taken in the Helsinki Final Act (1975)
and the Stockholm and Vienna Agreement (1986, 1990), which included the obligatory
observation of military exercises and on-site inspections. After the Cold War, the United
States and Russia deepended the confidence-building process in the Vienna Documents
(1992, 1994, 1999, 2011), the CFE Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty, which provided
inter alia the obervation of military exercises, the reduction of troop sizes, the renounce-
ment of certain classes of weapons, and aerial surveillance.
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The confidence-building process between the United States and Soviet Union exempli-
fies the stepwise nature of confidence-building with verifiable information transmission at
its heart. Confidence-building typically proceeds in three steps.5 First, states commonly
convey strategically relevant, yet non-verifiable information about military aspects, such
as via hotlines, visits, and reports.6 Such measures of non-verifiable information transmis-
sion are often discussed as ‘precursors’ for rather than as ‘real’ CBMs (Krepon, Newbill,
Khoja, and Drezin 1999, 4f.), unable to sincerely address insecurities between states (Des-
jardins 1996, 5, 16, 40, 61). Formally, they are analyzed as cheap talk (Fearon 1995).
In a next step, confidence-building continues with measures that further increase the
amount of militarily relevant information, but this time information is verifiable. Exam-
ples of verifiable information transmission include the observation of troop movements,
and the inspection of weapons arsenals or nuclear facilities. These steps are at the core of
CBMs, and are intended to prevent accidental war resulting from misunderstanding and
misinterpretation (United Nations 1982, 6ff.). Finally, the confidence-building process
may culminate in the conclusion of measures that constrain states militarily. Examples
include constraints on troop exercises, the reduction of troop size, and the renouncement
of certain classes of weapons. These measures are often discussed under the heading of
arms control and arms reduction measures, and arguably go beyond confidence-building
(United Nations 1982, 6ff.). In any case, verifiable information transmission is at the
heart of a stepwise confidence-building process. However, despite its outstanding role,
verifiable information transmission has been largely neglected in formal literature.
While CBMs can be concluded unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, the present
study focuses only on unilateral and bilateral measures of verifiable information trans-
mission. While multilateral CBMs clearly merit attention, one might argue that unilat-
eral and bilateral verifiable information transmission is the more theoretically interest-
ing phenomenon. For realists, it is surprising that states can unilaterally or bilaterally
pacify their relations beyond coercion and deterrence in an anarchic international system
(Mearsheimer 1995); liberalists wonder that any pair of states should be able to pacify
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relations, not just those with joint democracy, economic trade, or links via international
organizations (Oneal and Russett 2001); and for bargaining theorists, it is surprising that
states can manage the information problem without relaxing the unitary actor assump-
tion or introducing third parties (Fearon 1997; Kydd 2003; Rauchhaus 2006). In contrast,
multilateral measures are less puzzling because other states or organizations might pos-
sess an information advantage or enforcement capacities which facilitates the prevention
of violent conflict (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004).
The lack of formal models on verifiable information transmission is surprising given
that the desirability and effectiveness of these measures is debated. While most theorists
would doubt the relevance of CBMs, case study scholars and practicioners tend to evaluate
these measures positively (United Nations 1982; Krepon, Newbill, Khoja, and Drezin
1999). During the last twenty years, CBMs have been concluded between numerous dyads
across the world, and if CBMs were indeed detrimental or inconsequential, it would be a
puzzle why they are so frequently concluded. Nevertheless, case studies provide a mixed
record on the effectiveness of CBMs. On the one hand is supposedly successfull cases such
as the United States and Soviet Union, France and Germany, Argentina and Chile, or
Argentina and Brazil, where CBMs were followed by the absence of militarized interstate
disputes (MIDs).7 However, on the other hand is examples like India and Pakistan, who
took several bilateral steps of confidence-building, yet nevertheless experienced numerous
MIDs (Devabhaktuni, Rudolph, and Newbill 1999; Kapur 2005). All in all, the ubiquity
of CBMs and case study evidence suggest that CBMs can be beneficial and successful,
but only under certain conditions (Desjardins 1996, 5, 38f., 61). However, such conditions
have never been formally explored. The present study intends to fill this gap.
One notable exception to the scarcity of formal models on CBMs is Kydd (2005), who
conceptualizes confidence-building as a two-round Security Dilemma Game, whereby the
players can cooperate or defect in each round without knowing what the other party did
in that particular round. However, in the second round, both players know what the other
player did in the first round, and under certain conditions this first round behavior can
6
serve as a signal concerning the other player’s type. The shortcoming of Kydd’s model
is that it merely conceptualizes CBMs as a cooperative gesture, and does not model the
most important aspect of CBMs, namely the reduction of uncertainty about each other’s
war payoffs via the transmission of verifiable information about military aspects. I argue
that this aspect is best tackled in a model that explicitly identifies the lack of information
as a key cause of war, as Fearon’s (1995) crisis bargaining model does.
3 The Crisis Bargaining Framework
This section argues that unilateral and bilateral verifiable information transmission is
best analyzed as a solution to the information problem in a crisis bargaining model, thus
complementing other existing solutions to the information problem.
Fearon’s (1995) take-it-or-leave-it crisis bargaining model is the logical starting point
for modeling CBMs in general, and verifiable information transmission in particular. This
crisis bargaining model provides an explanation for why certain classes of wars occur,
namely accidental wars resulting from information problems, or preemptive and preven-
tive wars resulting from commitment problems. As CBMs address the information prob-
lem via information transmission and the commitment problem via military constraints,
CBMs address exactly the types of military conflicts identified by the crisis bargaining
model as the two key causes for war (Krepon, Newbill, Khoja, and Drezin 1999). Evi-
dently, there are other explanations for the occurrence of wars, including higher expected
payoffs from war than peaceful settlement (Fearon 1995, 386). However, the bargaining
model neither intends to explain these kinds of ‘aggressive’ conflicts, nor do CBMs have
the capacity to tackle them (United Nations 1982, 8; Krepon, Newbill, Khoja, and Drezin
1999, 4; Desjardins 1996, 4, 22). Thus, the crisis bargaining perspective appears to lend
itself perfectly for modeling CBMs.
Despite the closeness of the crisis bargaining perspective and CBMs, Kydd (2005)
rejects the idea of using this perspective for modeling CBMs. Kydd focuses on the role
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of trust when conceptualizing CBMs, arguing that trust should be perceived as “the
beliefs one side has about the likelihood that the other prefers to reciprocate cooperation
rather than exploit it” (Kydd 2005, 29). He therefore uses a Prisoner’s Dilemma and
an Assurance Game framework to model these two different underlying motivations,
rejecting the bargaining model because it focuses on “uncertainty about the bargaining
leverage of the two sides” (Kydd 2005, 30) rather than on uncertainty about underlying
motivations. Kydd adds, that in his view, “trust is more a matter of whether each side
will honor whatever bargain has been reached, rather than on what bargain is reached in
the first place”, which represents his second reason for not using the bargaining model
(Kydd 2005, 30). Although Kydd’s choice for the classical conflict games is justifiable
in light of his definition of trust, this study adopts a different perspective, holding that
the main purpose of CBMs is to shed light on the uncertain bargaining leverage that two
parties have in future crisis bargaining situations. That said, the crisis bargaining model
is the logical starting point for modeling CBMs.
As CBMs are intended to prevent accidental and preemptive or preventive wars, let us
recap why these wars occur in the crisis bargaining model (Fearon 1995). Accidental wars
occur because one party has uncertainty about the other party’s war payoffs. Facing a
risk-return-tradeoff, the party might propose the division of a contested good, which the
other party rejects because it expects higher payoffs from fighting. Thus, war occurs due
to a lack of information (the so-called information problem). Fearon then shows that war
can still happen with perfect information, namely due to changing military capabilities.
If a country expects to lose relative power in the future, it might be better to launch
a military strike today than to wait until tomorrow, as the rising country can hardly
commit to not exploiting its advantage and challenging in the future. Thus, war results
due to a lack of commitment (the so-called commitment problem). Given the ex-post
inefficiency of war, the question of whether states can address the information and the
commitment problem thus preventing inefficient war arises, and how this can be achieved
through unilateral and bilateral verifiable information transmission.
8
The literature discusses at least three possible solutions to the information problem.8
However, none of these solutions does justice to the present study’s topic of interest -
unilateral and bilateral verifiable information transmission. The first possible solution
to the information problem discussed within the literature is non-verifiable information
transmission or cheap talk (Fearon 1995, Kydd 1997). In an often-cited economic model,
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that two agents, a sender and a receiver, are better
off if the better-informed sender provides a noisy, non-verifiable signal to the receiver,
whose decision then affects both agents’ payoffs. However, Crawford/Sobel reveal that
this kind of non-verifiable information transmission only works if the parties’ interests are
not too far apart. In contrast, in a crisis bargaining model where the parties’ interests are
opposed, it is not possible to credibly communicate one’s own degree of resolve: states
have an incentive to say that they expect high war payoffs, despite in fact expecting low
war payoffs. This implies that any talk is incredible and inconsequential (Fearon 1995,
412; Guisinger and Smith 2002, 176), unless conducted in the shadow of costly signals
(Kurizaki 2007), occurring in multidimensional bargaining (Trager 2011), involving repu-
tation effects (Sartori 2002; Guisinger and Smith 2002), or containing no pre-commitment
to negotiation after diplomatic statements have been exchanged (Ramsay 2011). Cheap
talk or non-verifiable information transmission differs from verifiable information trans-
mission in the former being merely a verbal, non-verifiable announcement, whereas the
latter actually reveals, though only partially, a military aspect of interest.
The second solution to the information problem that has received large coverage is
costly signaling (Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997; Schultz 2001)9, examples of which include
the mobilization of troops or the announcement of one’s resolve in front of domestic or
foreign audiences. The idea is that costly signals separate resolved and unresolved types,
namely that resolved types send the signal whereas unresolved types do not.10 More
concretely, only the resolved types mobilize troops and thereby risk a war, or only the
resolved types threaten to fight a war because they know that a bluff will be punished by
domestic or foreign audiences.11 Formally, mobilization is modeled via sunk cost signals
9
that impose costs on all outcomes thus having pure informational value, while audience
costs are modeled via tying hands signals that impose costs only when a state backs down
after threatening to fight.12 Tying hands signals thus commit states to fighting, which is
supposed to prevent the opponent from challenging in the first place (Fearon 1997, 412).
Formally, costly signals differ from verifiable signals in that the former impose additional
costs on the payoffs, whereas the latter do not. Verifiable signals directly reveal something
about the uncertain aspect in the payoffs, whereas costly signals only do this indirectly
via the costs.
The third solution to the information problem is information transmission with the
help of a third party (Kydd 2003; Rauchhaus 2006). The idea is that a third party
might be better informed about a state’s opponent than the state itself is (though the
third party is not perfectly informed). This information advantage could be owing to
better intelligence gathering, communication, or past alliance ties. The third party then
communicates the information about the opponent to the other state, and the state
updates its belief. As information transmission is merely verbal (or cheap talk), the state
does not know for certain whether the third party is telling the truth. However, one can
show that the third party is credible if it has close ties with the state that it informs (Kydd
2003), or if it is impartial and has no strong interest in peace (Rauchhaus 2006). One
shortcoming of this literature is that it neglects how the third party actually acquires the
information (Kydd 2010, 117). Beyond that, it appears to only address rare empirical
occasions, because the third party needs to have close ties with one party, but good
information about another party with which it explicitly has no close ties.13 Formally,
cheap talk via third parties and verifiable information transmission are related: in both
cases, information about the uncertain war payoff is conveyed via a variable imperfectly
correlated with the variable of interest (third party knowledge vs. CBMs). Interestingly,
however, the present study shows that it does not require a third party to tackle the
information problem, as verifiable information transmission alone can achieve this.
The study most closely related to the present study is that of Black/Bulkley (1988).
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Coming from an economic context, the authors model a situation whereby a seller and
buyer bargain over the price of a commodity yet have uncertainty about its value, which
can be high or low. Thus, the seller does not know whether to price high or low. Trade
occurs if the bargain is struck, and otherwise it fails. Similarly to the present study’s
model, the parties can commit themselves to the revelation of a random variable, such
as their income or wealth, which correlates with the value of the commodity. This trans-
mission of verifiable information helps the seller to make a more appropriate offer, which
the buyer subsequently rejects with less frequency. The present study borrows the for-
malization of verifiable information transmission via the revelation of a random variable
from Black/Bulkley. However, it changes the interpretation of the model and the parties’
expected payoff functions (Black and Bulkley 1988). It deepens and extends the analysis,
presents all intermediate steps, and corrects for several mistakes.
4 The Model
This section develops a crisis bargaining model with uncertainty concerning war payoffs
that allows for verifiable information transmission. In a first step, the study adds a pre-
negotiation phase to the standard crisis bargaining model without verifiable information
transmission (4.1). In a second and third step, it considers the model with unilateral
(4.2) and bilateral (4.3) verifiable information transmission. It separately analyzes the
countries’ expected payoffs (4.1-4.3) and the probability of war (4.4). In the end, the study
shows that unilateral and bilateral verifiable information transmission is beneficial to the
countries in increasing their expected payoffs and that it is consequential in reducing the
risk of war.
4.1 Extending the Standard Crisis Bargaining Model
According to the standard take-it-or-leave-it crisis bargaining model (Fearon 1995), coun-
try A owns a good that country B would also like to possess. Country B threatens to fight
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a war over the contested good. However, as war is ex-post inefficient, country A prefers
to settle the dispute peacefully. With complete information, country A offers country B’s
reserve value from fighting, which country B accepts, and consequently no war occurs.
With incomplete information about country B’s expected war payoff, country A faces
a risk-return-tradeoff: country A can make a high offer that country B always accepts,
so that war is prevented. Alternatively, country A can make a low offer that only one
type of country B accepts and the other type of country B rejects, so that war results.
Depending on the belief about country B’s type, country A makes a high or low offer.
The present study modifies the standard crisis bargaining model in adding a pre-
negotiation phase at time point t0, in which both countries have uncertainty about the
other’s and their own expected war payoff. At time point t1, the model proceeds in the
standard way. The modification influences country A’s threshold for preferring one or
the other offer, and affects the calculation of expected payoffs viewed from time point t0.
The bargaining protocol of the extended model is depicted in Figure 1. At time
t0, Nature draws country A’s and country B’s type from a probability distribution over
two types: country A has low expected war payoffs (wA)
14 with probability c0 and high
expected war payoffs (wA) with probability 1− c0; and country B has low expected war
payoffs (wB) with probability a0 and high expected war payoffs (wB) with probability
1 − a0, with 1 − wB > 1 − wB > wA > wA.15 At time t0, both countries only know
the probabilities (correct prior beliefs), rather than the realization of the other’s and
their own expected war payoff, whereas at time t1 they know the realization of their own
expected war payoff. At time t1, country A makes an offer x to country B about the
division of a contested good, the value of which is normalized to 1, and country B accepts
or rejects the offer. If country B accepts the offer, country B receives x and country A
1−x. If country B rejects the offer, both countries fight a war and receive their expected
war payoff (which depends on Nature’s draw).
If country A knew country B’s type in advance, country A would offer country B’s
reserve value from fighting, wB or wB (plus ), which country B would accept. Thus,
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with certainty about country B’s expected war payoff, no war occurs. However, with
uncertainty about country B’s war payoff, country A offers wB or wB depending on its
prior belief about country B’s type. If country A finds country B likely to be strong, it
offers wB, both types of country B accept the offer, and country A receives 1 − wB. If
country A finds country B likely to be weak, it offers wB, country B accepts the offer
with probability a0 (being wB), in which case country A receives 1− wB, and country B
rejects the offer with probability 1− a0 (being wB), in which case country A receives its
expected war payoff, wA or wA depending on its type. Country A’s threshold of beliefs
for preferring one or the other offer is calculated separately for both types of country A:
Type wA prefers to offer wB over wB and risk a war if
a0 · (1− wB) + (1− a0) · wA > 1− wB,
⇒ a0 > a2 ≡ 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA .
Type wA prefers to offer wB over wB and risk a war if
a0 · (1− wB) + (1− a0) · wA > 1− wB,
⇒ a0 > a3 ≡ 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA .
Thus, there are two thresholds, a2 and a3, one for each type of country A, with a3 >
a2. Let us now calculate the countries’ expected payoffs in the case of no information
transmission for the three situations, a0 ≤ a2, a0 > a3, and a2 < a0 ≤ a3, and visualize
these expected payoffs in Figure 2(a) for different values of a0, with c0 held constant at
c0 = 0.3. The other parameter values are wB = 0.1, wB = 0.4, wA = 0.1, and wA = 0.4.
If a0 ≤ a2, both types of country A offer wB, which both types of country B accept.
Thus, country A’s expected payoff is 1 − wB, and country B’s is wB, both constant in
a0. In comparison, if a0 > a3, both types of country A offer wB, which country B accepts
if it expects low war payoffs (probability a0), and rejects if it expects high war payoffs
13
(probability 1 − a0). That said, without information transmission and a0 > a3, country
A’s expected payoff uA at t0 is
uA = a0 · (1− wB) + (1− a0) · (c0 · wA + (1− c0) · wA),
and country B’s expected payoff uB is
uB = a0 · wB + (1− a0) · wB.
Upon rearrangement, country A’s expected payoff is increasing in a0, while country B’s
expected payoff is decreasing in a0 (see Appendix A and Figure 2(a)). This means that
it is desirable for country A if country B likely has low expected war payoffs because
country B accepts the low offer, while for country B it is more beneficial if it likely has
high expected war payoffs.
Finally, in the third case of a2 < a0 ≤ a3, country A makes a high offer if it expects
low war payoffs (threshold a3; probability c0), and country A makes a low offer if it
expects high war payoffs (threshold a2; probability 1− c0). Country B always accepts the
high offer, and it accepts the low offer with probability a0, and rejects it with probability
1 − a0. Thus, without information transmission, if a2 < a0 ≤ a3, country A’s expected
payoff uA∗ at t0 is
uA∗ = c0 · (1− wB) + (1− c0) · (a0 · (1− wB) + (1− a0) · wA)
and country B’s expected payoff uB∗ at t0 is
uB∗ = c0 · wB + (1− c0) · (a0 · wB + (1− a0) · wB).
Thus, country A’s expected payoff is still increasing in a0, though less than in the previous
situation of a0 > a3, and country B’s expected payoff is still decreasing in a0, though again
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less than previously (see Appendix A and Figure 2(a)).
If a0 ≤ a2, fighting never occurs, and thus, there is no inefficiency. If a0 > a2, there
is a loss of expected surplus due to fighting. Thus, the question of whether the trans-
mission of verifiable information can reduce this loss of expected surplus and make the
two countries better off arises. The following sections compare a situation of no verifiable
information transmission with one of unilateral verifiable information transmission and of
bilateral verifiable information transmission, in order to show that verifiable information
transmission pays off under certain conditions.
4.2 Unilateral Verifiable Information Transmission
With unilateral verifiable information transmission, the bargaining protocol changes so
that country B can announce a signaling procedure at time t0, which commits country
B to transmitting verifiable information to country A at time t1. By using a signaling
procedure if a0 > a2, country B intends to influence country A’s beliefs about its type in
order that country A more often makes a high offer.
Formally, information transmission occurs via a random variable, the value of which
correlates with country B’s expected war payoff. More precisely, information transmission
leads to a randomization of country A’s beliefs, sometimes producing one posterior (e.g.
the posterior P (wB) = a2) and sometimes producing another posterior (e.g. the posterior
P (wB) = 1), yet always preserving the mean a0. The only problem for country B is finding
such a random variable that correlates with its war payoff, but as I argue below CBMs
can do the trick.
In the following, I consider the two situations of a0 > a3 and a2 < a0 ≤ a3 sepa-
rately.16 In each situation, I compare two possible information transmission procedures
that country B can take, showing that country B’s decision for one or the other procedure
depends on country B’s belief about country A having high or low war payoffs.
Starting with a0 > a3, assume that country B can decide between two signals, signal
z and signal y. Signal z takes the values z and z and is such that P (wB|z) = a2, and
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P (wB|z) = 1. It follows from Bayes rule that P (z) · a2 + P (z) = a017, which means that
country A remains indifferent between its post- and pre-signaling beliefs. Signal y takes
the values y and y and is such that P (wB|y) = a3, and P (wB|y) = 1. It also follows
from Bayes rule that P (y) · a3 + P (y) = a0, which means that country A again remains
indifferent between its post- and pre-signaling beliefs. It is clearly visible that the z-signal
induces a larger change in beliefs than the y-signal as a2 < a3. If country B knew country
A’s type in advance, it would want to choose the z-signal for type wA (threshold a2)
and the y-signal for type wA (threshold a3). However, as country B is uncertain about
country A’s type, the choice depends on country B’s belief about the likelihood for one or
the other type. Country B decides between the two signals based on its expected payoffs,
which are calculated separately for the z-signal and the y-signal as follows:
If z is sent, both types of country A believe that country B is wB with probability
a2, and as a2 ≤ a2, they offer wB. Both types of country B accept this offer. If z is sent,
both types of country A believe that country B is wB (for sure), and they offer wB which
country B always accepts.
Thus, given the z-signal, the expected payoff uAz for country A at t0 is
uAz = P (z) · (1− wB) + P (z) · (1− wB),
and the expected payoff uBz for country B at t0 is
uBz = P (z) · wB + P (z) · wB.
Inserting P (z) = 1−a0
1−a2 and rearranging the terms, one can show that country A’s and
country B’s expected payoffs are always higher than the expected payoffs without in-
formation transmission (see Appendix B and Figure 2(b)). Thus, if the z-signal is sent,
unilateral information transmission pays off for country A and for country B. In addition,
with the z-signal, country A and country B always settle their dispute peacefully and no
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war occurs.
On the other hand, if y is sent, both types of country A believe that country B is wB
with probability a3. In this case, country A offers wB if its war payoff is wA (threshold a3,
probability c0), and country A offers wB if its war payoff is wA (threshold a2, probability
1−c0). The offer wB is accepted by both types of country B, while the offer wB is accepted
by only one type of country B (wB, probability a3), and therefore war sometimes occurs.
If y is sent, both types of country A believe that country B is wB (for sure) and they
offer wB which country B always accepts.
Thus, given the y-signal, for country A the expected payoff uAy at t0 is:
uAy = P (y) ·
(
c0 · (1− wB) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (1− wB) + (1− a3) · wA)
)
+ P (y) · (1− wB),
and for country B, the expected payoff uBy at t0 is:
uBy = P (y) ·
(
c0 · wB + (1− c0) · (a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB)
)
+ P (y) · wB.
Inserting P (y) = 1−a0
1−a3 and rearranging the terms, one can show that country A’s expected
payoff is equal to the expected payoff without information transmission, and that country
B’s expected payoff is higher than the expected payoff without information transmission
(see Appendix C and Figure 2(c)). Thus, unilateral information transmission via the y-
signal has no effect on country A and is beneficial for country B. As country B sometimes
rejects country A’s offer, war still occurs.
When comparing country B’s expected payoffs for the z- and the y-signal, one can
note that country B’s preference for one or the other signal depends on its belief about
country A’s type (c0). Country B prefers the z-Signal if c0 ≤ c1, and country B prefers
the y-signal if c0 > c1 with c1 =
1−wB−wA
1−wB−wA (see Appendix D).
Let us continue with the case of a2 < a0 ≤ a3. Now, country B decides between the
z-signal and the w-signal (the y-signal cannot be used because mixing between y and
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y never allows country B to keep country A indifferent between post- and pre-signaling
beliefs). The z-signal works like before, and thus generates the same expected payoff
function. The w-signal also takes two values, w and w, and is such that P (wB|w) = a2,
and P (wB|w) = a3. Country A again remains indifferent between its pre- and post-
signaling beliefs so that P (w) ·a2 +P (w) ·a3 = a0. Again, the z-signal induces a more far
reaching change in beliefs than the w-signal. If w is sent, both types of country A believe
that country B is type wB with probability a2, and as a2 ≤ a2, they offer wB. Both types
of country B accept this offer. If w is sent, both types of country A believe that country
B is wB with probability a3, and country A offers wB if it is type wA (threshold a3,
probability c0), and country A offers wB if it is type wA (threshold a2, probability 1− c0).
The offer wB is accepted by both types of country B, while the offer wB is accepted by
only one type of country B, so that war sometimes occurs.
Given the w-signal, country A’s expected payoff uAw at t0 is:
uAw = P (w) · (1−wB) +P (w) ·
(
c0 · (1−wB)) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (1−wB) + (1− a3) ·wA)
)
,
and country B’s expected payoff uBw at t0 is:
uBw = P (w) · (wB) + P (w) ·
(
c0 · (wB)) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (wB) + (1− a3) · wB)
)
.
Inserting P (w) = a3−a0
a3−a2 and rearranging the terms, it is visible, such as in the case of
the y-signal, that unilateral information transmission via the w-signal has no effect for
country A and is beneficial for country B (see Appendix C and Figure 2(c)). When
comparing country B’s expected payoffs for the z- and the w-signal, one can show that
the threshold for choosing one or the other signal is the same as previously, c1. Country
B prefers the z-Signal if c0 ≤ c1, and country B prefers the w-signal if c0 > c1 with
c1 =
1−wB−wA
1−wB−wA . Again, it holds that war is always prevented with the z-signal, while war
may still occur with the w-signal.
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To sum up, in all cases of unilateral information transmission, one can note that
country B is better off with than without unilateral information transmission (Fig. 2(b),
2(c)). By contrast, for country A it depends on the signal sent: when the z-signal is sent
(Fig. 2(b)), country A is better off with unilateral information transmission by country
B compared to no information transmission, whereas, when the y- and the w-signal is
sent (Fig. 2(c)), country A is indifferent between unilateral information transmission by
country B and no information transmission.18 Thus, in the latter case the question of
whether country A can be better off if it also announces a signaling strategy arises.
4.3 Bilateral Verifiable Information Transmission
We next allow for bilateral verifiable information transmission by country B and country
A. The bargaining protocol changes so that at t0, after country B has decided to send a
signal, country A can also decide to send a signal the value of which will be revealed at
t1. After Nature has determined the value of the signal at t1, country A makes an offer
that country B can accept or reject. As previously argued, if a0 > a2 and c0 ≤ c1, so that
the z-signal is sent, counter-signaling would not be beneficial to country A. However,
if a0 > a2 and c0 > c1 and the y- or w-signal is sent, war still occurs and unilateral
information transmission by country B has no effect for country A. In this situation,
country A’s motivation for information transmission is to influence country B’s beliefs
about its type so that country B more often plays the beneficial z-strategy.
Formally, information transmission by country A is also modeled via a random vari-
able. If a0 > a2 and c0 > c1, country A sends a signal v that takes the values v and v, and
is such that P (wA|v) = 1, and P (wA|v) = c1. This time, country B remains indifferent
between its pre- and post-signaling beliefs so that P (v) ·1 +P (v) · c1 = c0 (following from
Bayes rule). If v is sent, country B believes that country A is wA (for sure), and sends
the y- or w-signal (c0 > c1). If v is sent, country B believes that country A is wA with
probability c1, and sends the z-signal (c1 ≤ c1). Both countries get their expected payoffs
from the respective signals.
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Thus, if c0 > c1, for country A, the expected payoff at t0 with the v-signal is:
uAv = P (v) ·
(
P (y) · (1−wB)+P (y) · (1−wB)
)
+P (v) ·
(
P (z) · (1−wB)+P (z) · (1−wB)
)
if a0 > a3, and
uAv∗ = P (v) ·
(
P (w) ·(1−wB)+P (w) ·(1−wB)
)
+P (v) ·
(
P (z) ·(1−wB)+P (z) ·(1−wB)
)
if a2 < a0 ≤ a3.
For country B, the expected payoff at t0 with the v-signal is:
uBv = P (v) ·
(
P (y) · wB + P (y) · wB
)
+ P (v) ·
(
P (z) · wB + P (z) · wB
)
if a0 > a3, and
uBv∗ = P (v) ·
(
P (w) · wB + P (w) · wB
)
+ P (v) ·
(
P (z) · wB + P (z) · wB
)
if a2 < a0 ≤ a3.
By inserting the critical terms and rearranging the expressions, one can show that, for
country A, bilateral information transmission is better than unilateral information trans-
mission and no information transmission, while for country B, bilateral information trans-
mission is as good as unilateral information transmission, yet better than no information
transmission (see Appendix E and Figure 2(d)).
Figures 3(a)-(c) illustrate these findings in a three-dimensional setting when both a0
and c0 vary (with wB = 0.1, wB = 0.4, wA = 0.1, and wA = 0.4). For country A, unilateral
information transmission by country B is beneficial below the critical threshold c1 = 0.4,
while bilateral information transmission is beneficial above this critical threshold. For
country B, in contrast, unilateral information transmission is beneficial independent of
c0, while bilateral information transmission provides no extra gain compared to unilateral
information transmission.19
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4.4 The Probability of War
I have shown that both countries gain from unilateral information transmission if the z-
signal is sent, and that they gain from bilateral information transmission in comparison
with no information transmission. Next, I compare the risk of war in the case of no infor-
mation transmission with the case of unilateral and bilateral information transmission.
I show that unilateral information transmission eliminates the risk of war if the z-signal
is sent, and reduces the risk of war if the y- or w-signal is sent. Bilateral information
transmission always eliminates the risk of war. It generally holds that war only occurs,
if country A makes a low offer that country B rejects because it expects high war pay-
offs. Thus, if a0 ≤ a2, war never occurs because, even without information transmission,
both types of country A always make a high offer which country B always accepts. The
situation changes for a2 < a0 ≤ a3 and a0 > a3 as the following two paragraphs show.
Starting with the case of a2 < a0 ≤ a3 and no information transmission, country A
makes a low offer if it expects high war payoffs, which country B rejects if it also expects
high war payoffs. Thus, the probability of war at t0 is P (wA) ·P (wB) = (1− c0) · (1−a0).
If unilateral information transmission takes place, two cases have to be distinguished,
c0 ≤ c1 and c0 > c1. If c0 ≤ c1, country B chooses the z-signal that eliminates the risk
of war for the following reason: If the value of the z-signal is z, both types of country A
update the belief to P (wB|z) = a2 and make a high offer that country B always accepts,
consequently no war occurs. If the value of the z-signal is z, both types of country A
update the belief to P (wB|z) = 1 and make a low offer that country B again always
accepts, as it is the low type for certain. Thus, the z-signal reduces the probability of
war to zero.
In the second case, c0 > c1, country B chooses the w-signal. This signal reduces the
risk of war, yet does not eliminate it, for the following reason: if the value of the w-signal
is w, both types of country A update the belief about country B to P (wB|w) = a2 and
make a high offer that country B always accepts. However, if the value of the w-signal
is w, both types of country A update the belief to P (wB|w) = a3. In this situation, one
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type of country A (wA) makes a high offer as its threshold is a3, while the other type
of country A (wA) makes a low offer as its threshold is a2. Country B rejects the low
offer if it expects high war payoffs. Thus, the probability of war for a2 < a0 ≤ a3 and
the w-signal at t0 is P (w) · P (wA) · P (wB|w) = a0−a2a3−a2 · (1 − c0) · (1 − a3), which is lower
than the probability of war if no information transmission occurs, (1− c0) · (1− a0). The
probability of war changes to zero, if we add information transmission by country A via
the v-signal. If the value of the v-signal is v, country B updates its belief about country
A to P (wA|v) = c1 and sends the z-signal, which never results in war, as previously
shown. If the value of the v-signal is v, country B updates its belief about country A to
P (wA|v) = 1 and sends the w-signal randomizing between the beliefs P (wB|w) = a2 and
P (wB|w) = a3. As P (wA|v) = 1, country A expects low war payoffs for certain and has
the threshold a3. This implies that country A always makes a high offer, which country
B always accepts. Thus, with bilateral information transmission, the risk of war changes
to zero.
In the second case, if a0 > a3 and no information transmission occurs, country A
always makes a low offer which country B rejects if it expects high war payoffs. Thus,
the probability of war at t0 is P (wB) = (1−a0). Once we allow for unilateral information
transmission and distinguish c0 ≤ c1 and c0 > c1, the probability of war is zero if c0 ≤ c1,
as the z-signal is sent (see above), and the probability of war is larger than zero if c0 > c1,
as the y-signal is sent. More concretely, if the y-signal takes the value y, both types of
country A update the belief about country B to P (wB|y) = 1 and make a low offer,
which country B always accepts as it expects low war payoffs for certain. If the value
of the y-signal is y, both types of country A update the belief to P (wB|y) = a3. In this
situation, one type of country A (wA) makes a high offer as its threshold is a3, while the
other type of country A (wA) makes a low offer as its threshold is a2. Country B rejects
this low offer if it expects high war payoffs. Thus, the probability of war with a0 > a3 and
the y-signal at t0 is P (y) ·P (wA) ·P (wB|y) = 1−a01−a3 · (1− c0) · (1− a3) = (1− a0) · (1− c0),
which is lower than the probability of war if no information transmission occurs, (1−a0).
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Similarly to the previous case, this risk of war changes to zero, if we add information
transmission by country A via the v-signal, for the same reason as above.
To summarize, unilateral information transmission is beneficial to both countries and
eliminates the risk of war if the signaling country is likely to be weak (a0 > a2) and its
opponent is likely to be strong (c0 ≤ c1) as this implies the z-signal. In contrast, unilateral
information transmission is only beneficial to one country and only reduces the risk of war
without eliminating it, if both countries are likely to be weak (a0 > a2 and c0 > c1), as
this implies the w- or the y-signal. However, as this latter kind of unilateral information
transmission has no effect for one country, yet can become beneficial through counter-
signaling, it is likely that the country conditions its support for information transmission
on its bilateral nature. This completely eliminates the risk of war.
5 Discussing Assumptions and Implications
One of the model’s key assumptions is that verifiable information transmission occurs
via a randomizing procedure, which allows the signaling state to have perfect influence
on its opponent’s posterior beliefs, provided that the prior belief is preserved on average.
However, if the mean of the posteriors after signaling accords with the mean without
signaling, sometimes the opponent finds the signaling state more likely to be strong, and
at other times more likely to be weak. This happens due to states a priori committing
themselves to the revelation of a certain piece of information, which later results in one
of the two posteriors probabilistially. Let me further elaborate on this.
In order to gain a better understanding of what the theoretical mechanism means
in practice, let us consider a realistic bargaining scenario and what the random variable
might stand for in such a case. Let us assume that both country A and B know that they
might be fighting about something in the future, but neither of them know the amount
of troops that country B will be able to devote to the fight. The reasons for country B’s
uncertainty concerning its own troop allocation might be manifold: Country B might be
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threatened by other adversaries, internal or external, at the same time as the issue with
country A emerges, in order that parts of the troops will be occupied and not all troops
can be devoted to the issue of contention with country A; there might be an economic
crisis or change to a new government with other priorities; alternatively, global politics
might change prompting new suppporters to arise and others vanish. Let us keep matters
simple and assume with the model that the random variable can only take two values.
Accordingly, country A and B might be uncertain about whether country B’s military
capabilities are high or low. However, both states have the same correct prior belief about
the probability, and if this belief is above a critical threshold in order that country B is
likely to be weak, country B can only expect a low offer implying a positive risk of war.
In this situation of uncertainty, country B has an incentive to reveal military informa-
tion to country A. For example, country B might let country A position observers on its
ground so that country A might be better informed about the actual troop movements
once a contentious issue arises. Subsequently, if troop movements are low, country A is
assured that country B will not devote many troops, and the offer will remain low. How-
ever, this is inconsequential for country B, as the offer would have been low regardless,
given the prior belief. Therefore, upon learning that it is weak, country B has no incen-
tive to deviate from its signaling procedure as the result is the same - and even if it had,
there would be practically no possibility of refraining from it, as country A’s observers
are already on the ground given the prior commitment. On the other hand, it might also
be that troop movements are high, indicating that country B more likely devotes a high
amount of military capabilities. In this case, country A is induced to make a high offer,
which is beneficial to country B compared to the low offer according to the prior belief,
and also beneficial to country A given the prevention of war. While one might think that
a strong country B would even want to fully reveal information about its strength, given
that the offer is already high, there is no additional gain. To the contrary, coming from
the model’s assumption that the correct prior belief is preserved on average, a change
in belief to a posterior left of a2 (resulting in a higher probability of country B being
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strong) implies a lower probability of this case occurring in the first place, which is not
in country B’s interest (see Appendix F).
It becomes apparent through this example that inspections should be tailored to the
problem at hand. If states face uncertainty about their future level of troop deployments,
like during the Cold War rivalry, on-site inspections of troop manoeuvers is probably the
means of choice. However, if states face uncertainty concerning their maritime ambitions,
like in the dispute over the Spratly Islands, cooperative monitoring via satellite imagery
could represent one way to prevent incidents at sea. Alternatively, if states are unsure
whether uranium enrichment facilities will be used for peaceful or aggressive purposes,
they might allow observers to such facilities, like in the case of Argentina and Brazil.
Despite such measures never providing full certainty about another state’s intentions,
they yield valuable information that helps to update the belief about the other’s type.
The model also identifies the conditions under which we should see no information
transmission, unilateral verifiable information transmission or bilateral verifiable informa-
tion transmission. For each unilateral and bilateral information transmission, the model
thus far considers one set of posteriors, calculates the expected payoffs for that case, and
compares them to each other in order to determine the superiority of one or the other
signaling procedure. However, as previously indicated, states can deliberately choose the
posteriors in advance, and they could well have chosen others. Accordingly, the compari-
son of the signaling procedures only makes sense, if the induced choice of posterior beliefs
assumed thus far is optimal from the signaling state’s viewpoint. That this optimality is
in fact given proves Appendix F. Once the optimality and comparability of the signaling
procedures is established, one can illustrate the conditions for one or the other signaling
procedure to hold in more detail. This is achieved in the following paragraphs with a
brief outline of two cases.
First, the model predicts unilateral information transmission by a country if that
country is likely to be weak (a0 > a2) and its opponent is likely to be strong (c0 ≤ c1)
as this implies the z-signal, which is beneficial to both parties. It is worth noting the
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following about the timing of unilateral information transmission: assuming that we start
with a situation of no information transmission, which implies that the signaling party
likely was strong (a0 ≤ a2), it must be that the signaling party has lost military power
shortly before it took a signaling stance.
This logic of unilateral information transmission is reflected in the Cold War rivalry
between the United States and Soviet Union. Despite this rivalry not being characterized
purely by unilateral information transmission, nevertheless it is clearly evident that the
weaker side, the Soviet Union, made much larger concessions with respect to confidence-
building in general and verifiable information transmission in particular than the stronger
side, the United States (Leffler 2007, 392). For example, when the Soviet Union agreed
on a moratorium on nuclear testing, the United States doubted the verifiability of the
nuclear halt. In response, the Soviet Union unilaterally allowed the United States to
set up monitoring stations close to the testing range on Soviet soil, in order to allow
for better verifiability of the halt (Kydd 2005, 225f.). Another example for the Soviet
Union’s willingness to signal is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, where
Gorbachev wanted to proceed by destroying far more missiles than the United States,
and by allowing unilaterally for intrusive on-site inspections in order to assure the United
States of a radical change in Soviet policy (Kydd 2005, 227f.; Hanes, Hanes, and Baker
2003, 354; and Brown 2010, 263). Other unilateral confidence-building measures by
the Soviet Union included the withdrawal from Afghanistan, unilateral troop reductions,
and the permission of Eastern regimes to fall, in order to indicate a lack of territorial
ambitions (Leffler 2007, 403, 421, 437). All such initiatives were taken at a point in time
when the Soviet Union had arguably lost power: Starting in the 1970s, the Soviet Union
had suffered from severe economic decline and the burdens of empire (Kydd 2005, 216;
Leffler 2007, 350).
Second, the model predicts bilateral information transmission if both countries are
likely to be weak (c0 > c1 and a0 > a2) as this implies the y- and w-signaling strategy
by country B, which country A counters with the v-signaling strategy in order to induce
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country B to more often play the z-signaling strategy. The following claim can be made as
regarding the timing of bilateral information transmission: assuming that we start with a
situation of no information transmission or unilateral information transmission, bilateral
information transmission is a likely outcome if at least one country looses military power,
i.e. if it loses in military capabilities, devalues the contested good, or has higher costs of
fighting a war.
The Argentina-Brazil rivalry exemplifies this logic. In the 1970s, Argentina and Brazil
competed for regional influence (Child 1985, 98). Both countries started to develop nu-
clear programs aimed at self-sufficiency, and both were embroiled in a border struggle over
hydropower resources (Child 1985, 100f.). Given their opposed ambitions and uncertainty
about their military power, militarized conflict due to misperception or miscalculation
could not be excluded (Lipson 2003, 144). At the end of the 1970s and the beginning
of the 1980s, however, the political situation changed, with Argentina and Brazil facing
severe economic downturns and civil unrests, Argentina emerged as a weak party from
the lost Falkland war, Brazil had strained relations to its former strong ally, the United
States, and the military dictatorships were coming to an end (Lipson 2003, 144). In short,
both countries, particularly Argentina, expected less from fighting a war with each other
than before, which opened the possibility of confidence-building steps.
In this situation, Argentina advanced with confidence-building gestures, which Brazil
reciprocated. In 1983, Argentina briefed Brazil about the development of a gaseous
diffusion enrichment facility before this development became public, and Brazil made
a similar gesture in 1987. In 1987, Argentinian president Alfonsin invited Brazilian
president Sarney to visit the unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu gaseous diffusion facility as a
first verification step, and this measure was taken despite Brazil having knownly not
informed Argentina about its nuclear test site at Cachimbo, which was denied until 1990.
However, Brazil reciprocated Argentina’s benevolent gesture by counter-inviting Alfonsin
to the official inauguration of the Aramar gas centrifuge facility (Redick 1999, 228f.).
A third significant step in verifiable information transmission followed in 1990, with
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Brazil’s economy further deteriorating: Argentina and Brazil signed the Foz de Iguacu
Declaration on the Common Nuclear Policy, formally renouncing nuclear weapons and
establishing a framework for the implementation of a bilateral nuclear accounting and
inspection arrangement and full-scope IAEA safeguards. This arrangement led to the
mutual inspection of nuclear facilities (Lipson 2003, 144).
Third, the model predicts that the risk of war disappears with unilateral and bilateral
information transmission, which is supported by the two previous cases. There has been
no direct military confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union or Russia
since the mid-1980s, and regarding the Argentina-Brazil case, one author assessed that
there was “not even a remote possibility of an armed clash involving these two countries”
(Child 1985, 104).
6 Conclusion
I presented a game-theoretic take-it-or-leave-it crisis bargaining model that allows for
unilateral and bilateral verifiable information transmission. My contribution is two-
fold. From the perspective of verifiable information transmission as the key aspect of
confidence-building measures, I contend that we regularly observe this phenomenon em-
pirically, yet do not know much about the conditions for verifiable information transmis-
sion occurring in the first place and being successful in reducing the risk of war in the
second place. Formal models can inform us about these two conditions, and thus help
us to address an empirical puzzle. In contrast, when considering the study’s contribu-
tion from the perspective of the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining model, this model poses
the question of how states can prevent the ex-post inefficient outcome of war. Existing
solutions relax the unitary actor assumption or introduce third parties. By contrast, this
study highlights that unilateral or bilateral verifiable information transmission succeed
in preventing the ex-post inefficient outcome of war, and thus offers a solution to the
bargaining problem without relaxing the unitary actor assumption or introducing third
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parties.
The analysis predicts unilateral verifiable information transmission if the signaling
state expects low payoffs and the other expects high payoffs from fighting. It predicts
bilateral verifiable information transmission if both states expect low payoffs from fight-
ing. Finally, verifiable information transmission successfully reduces the risk of war when
it induces a sufficiently large change in beliefs. Interestingly, these predictions are very
similar to the predictions of Kydd (2005). Kydd holds that confidence-building takes
place if both states have a sufficient level of trust, i.e. they believe each other likely to
be security seekers rather than expansionists, and that confidence-building successfully
prevents the occurrence of war if the confidence-building steps are large enough (Kydd
2005, 193, 197). However, unlike the present study, Kydd models confidence-building as
a cooperative gesture in the first stage of a 2x2 conflict game with uncertainty about mo-
tivations. In contrast, the present study explicitly formalizes the most prevalent aspect
of confidence-building, the transmission of verifiable information about military aspects,
and thus focuses on a different aspect of CBMs. However, a systematic comparison of the
two models and an assessment of which holds superiority stands out for future research.
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Figure 1: Extended Version of the Standard Crisis Bargaining Model
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Figure 2: Expected payoffs for country A and country B with a) no signal (c0 = 0.3), b)
z signal (c0 = 0.3), c) y & w signal (c0 = 0.65), d) plus: v signal (c0 = 0.65)
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Figure 3: Expected payoffs for country A with a) no information transmission, b) uni-
lateral information transmission, and c) bilateral information transmission in a three-
dimensional setting
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Notes
1These later measures are also known under the term ‘Confidence- and Security-Building Measures’
(CSBMs).
2Some recent studies examine the incentives of state to create, instead of eliminate, strategic ambi-
guity; see Meirowitz and Sartori (2008) and Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2008).
3In the words of Alford (1981, 135f.):”Indeed, signalling is what CBMs are mainly concerned with.
They are intended to help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of
continuous military activity. They are devices to filter out all extraneous events, leaving behind certain
indicators that, either singly or in combination, provide hard information that a state is preparing for
war.”
4Unilateral CBMs are measures taken by one state alone vis a vis another state, a group of states, or
the international community. Bilateral CBMs commit two states to reciprocally sharing military infor-
mation, whereas multilateral measures commit either two states with the help of a third party, or more
than two states. Of the three types of CBMs, unilateral CBMs are the least known. They have been dis-
cussed in the context of the Cold War (Krepon 1999, 1), and were recently mentioned with respect to the
China-Taiwan dispute (Glosserman 2005, v), the Iran crisis (http://www.presstv.ir/detail/234770.html),
and in relation to space security (Robinson, Schaefer, Schrogel, and Dunk von der 2011, 7).
5Cp. http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/infoCBM/.
6Some authors have offered a broad conceptualization of CBMs, including non-military cultural and
economic CBMs, such as people-to-people contact or the lifting of travel and trade barriers. In this study,
CBMs include all measures that inform about the countries’ expected war payoff. At first sight, this
seems to only include military CBMs, however, as the expected war payoff also consists of the costs of
fighting, such as opportunity costs of foregone trade, this study does not constrain CBMs to the military
dimension.
7Arguably, the absence of MIDs in these dyads is also due to realist or liberalist influences, such
as the balance of power, or joint democracy, trade, and international organizations. In a case study
or quantitative analysis, one would carefully have to control for these influences and examine whether
CBMs have an extra pacifying effect.
8Solutions to the commitment problem are not discussed here because this is not the present study’s
focus, however for an example see Chadefaux (2011).
9Note that these studies model costly signaling in a defender-challenger-framework, and not in the
present study’s crisis bargaining framework.
10This argument was later qualified by Slantchev (2010) showing that it sometimes pays off for the
resolved type not to use the signal and instead pretend to be weak. Although this does not necessarily
discourage the other party from challenging in the first place, pretending to be weak can increase the
chance of victory if a war is fought, as it prompts the other party to mobilize less resources.
11It is not quite clear why the audience would punish a government for backing down, if such an action
is rational for the country. In order to make sense of punishment by an audience, some authors introduce
a reputation effect, like Sartori (2002), and combine it with audience costs, like Guisinger and Smith
(2002).
12Divergent is Slantchev (2005), who argues that militarization has a dual role.
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13Relatedly, Meirowitz and Sartori (2008) examine whether perfect monitoring, presumably via a third
party, can eliminate the risk of war. Though the authors show that there is a beneficial effect of perfect
monitoring, they concede that such a scenario is unrealistic and that the beneficial effect vanishes once
only a little bit of noise is introduced.
14Expected war payoffs (w) are usually calculated as the probability of winning (p) times the value of
the contested good (here normalized to 1), minus the cost of fighting (c) which typically varies for the
two players. Thus: wA = p− cA for one player and wB = 1− p− cB for the other player. States can be
uncertain about the cost of fighting, the value of the good, or the probability of winning. Uncertainty
about the probability of winning makes calculations more complicated, thus, for simplification, most
authors assume uncertainty about costs or about the value of the contested good (see Fearon (1995),
div. Wittman (2009)).
15Assuming that wA = p − cA, wA = p − cA, wB = 1 − p − cB , and wB = 1 − p − cB , it follows that
1− wB = p + cB > 1− wB = p + cB > wA = p− cA > wA = p− cA.
16For a0 ≤ a2, there is no inefficiency due to fighting, which is why such a case is not considered here.
In this situation, country A would nevertheless like to know more about country B’s type, but as country
B can expect a high offer from country A, it has no incentive to reveal information about its type. Thus,
no information transmission occurs.
17
P (z) · a2 + P (z) · 1 =
P (z) · P (wB |z) + P (z) · P (wB |z) =
P (wB) · P (z|wB) + P (wB) · P (z|wB) =
P (wB) = a0
18Although the z-signal induces country A to sometimes make a high offer, which provides lower payoffs
to country A than a low offer, country A nevertheless gains from the z-signal. The reason is that country
A is better informed and can thus make a more appropriate offer which prevents the inefficient outcome
of war. However, with the y- or w-signal, country A has to make a high offer too often and thus the
beneficial effect of information transmission disappears.
19Figure 3(a) shows that country A’s expected payoff is independent of c0 if a0 ≤ a2 or decreases with
c0 if a0 > a2, and that country B’s expected payoff is independent of c0 if a0 ≤ a2 and a0 > a3 or
increases with c0 if a2 < a0 ≤ a3. The interpretation is that with c0 increasing (and a2 < a0 ≤ a3),
country A can expect less from fighting, which is bad for country A yet good for country B, as country
B more often receives a high offer.
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Appendices
A Expected Payoffs Without Verifiable Information
Transmission
Without information transmission and a0 > a3, country A’s expected payoff uA can be
rearranged to read
uA = ((1− c0) · wA + c0 · wA) + (1− wB − wA + c0 · (wA − wA)) · a0.
It holds that uA(1) = 1− wB, and ∂uA∂a0 > 0.
Without information transmission and a2 < a0 ≤ a3, country A’s expected payoff uA∗
can be rearranged to read
uA∗ = ((1− c0) · wA + c0 · (1− wB)) + (1− wB − wA − c0 · (1− wB − wA)) · a0.
It holds that uA∗(a2) = 1 − wB, and ∂uA∗∂a0 < ∂uA∂a0 . Moreover, uA(a3) = uA∗(a3) as the
following calculation shows:
uA(a3) = uA∗(a3)
⇒ ((1− c0) · wA + c0 · wA) + (1− wB − wA + c0 · (wA − wA)) · a3
= ((1− c0) · wA + c0 · (1− wB)) + (1− wB − wA − c0 · (1− wB − wA)) · a3
⇒ a3 = 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA ,
which is true.
Without information transmission and a0 > a3, country B’s expected payoff uB can be
rearranged to read
uB = wB − (wB − wB) · a0.
It holds that uB(1) = wB, and
∂uB
∂a0
< 0.
Without information transmission and a2 < a0 ≤ a3, country B’s expected payoff uB∗
can be rearranged to read
uB∗ = wB − (1− c0) · (wB − wB) · a0.
38
It holds that uB∗(a2) < wB, and ∂uB∗∂a0 >
∂uB
∂a0
. Moreover, uB∗(a3) > uB(a3) as the following
calculation shows:
uB∗(a3) > uB(a3)
⇒ wB − (1− c0) · (wB − wB) · a3 > wB − (wB − wB) · a3
⇒ −c0 < 0,
which is true.
B Expected Payoffs with Unilateral Information Trans-
mission, z-Signal
Show that country A’s expected payoff is higher with the z-signal than without signaling.
With the z-signal, country A’s expected payoff is
uAz =
1− a0
1− a2 · (1− wB) +
a0 − a2
1− a2 · (1− wB).
It holds that uAz(a2) = 1− wB, and uAz(1) = 1− wB. Country A’s expected payoff can
be rearranged to read
uAz =
1
1− a2 · (1− wB − a2 · (1− wB)) +
1
1− a2 · (wB − wB) · a0.
It holds that ∂uAz
∂a0
< ∂uA
∂a0
as the following calculation shows:
∂uAz
∂a0
<
∂uA
∂a0
⇒ 1
1− a2 · (wB − wB) < 1− wB − wA + c0 · (wA − wA)
⇒ 1− wB − wA < 1− wB − wA + c0 · (wA − wA),
which is true.
Given the same end point, it follows that the z-signal provides a higher expected payoff
to country A than no signaling.
Show that country B’s expected payoff is higher with the z-signal than without signaling.
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With the z-signal, country B’s expected payoff is
uBz =
1− a0
1− a2 · wB +
a0 − a2
1− a2 · wB.
It holds that uBz(a2) = wB > uB∗(a2) = wB − (1− c0) · (wB −wB) · a2, and uBz(1) = wB.
Country B’s expected payoff can be rearranged to read
uBz =
1
1− a2 · (wB − a2 · wB)−
1
1− a2 · (wB − wB) · a0.
It holds that uBz(a3) =
1−a3
1−a2 · wB + a3−a21−a2 · wB which is higher than the expected payoff
without information transmission as the following calculation shows:
uBz(a3) =
1− a3
1− a2 · wB +
a3 − a2
1− a2 · wB > uB∗(a3) = wB − (1− c0) · (wB − wB) · a3
⇒ a3 + a2 < (1− c0) · a3 · (1− a2)
⇒ (1− wB − wA) · (wB − wB) < 0,
which is true.
In summary, it follows that the z-signal provides a higher expected payoff to country B
than no signaling.
C Expected Payoffs with Unilateral Information Trans-
mission, y-&w-Signal
Show that the y- and the w-signal provide the same expected payoff to country A as no
signaling. With the y-signal (a0 > a3), country A’s expected payoff is
uAy =
1− a0
1− a3 ·
(
c0 · (1−wB) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (1−wB) + (1−a3) ·wA)
)
+
a0 − a3
1− a3 · (1−wB).
It holds that uAy(1) = 1− wB. Country A’s expected payoff can be rearranged to read
uAy =
1
1− a3 ·
(
c0 · (1− wB) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (1− wB) + (1− a3) · wA)− a3 · (1− wB)
)
− 1
1− a3 ·
(
c0 · (1− wB) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (1− wB) + (1− a3) · wA)− (1− wB)
)
· a0.
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The slope can be simplified to read
∂uAy
∂a0
= −
(
(1− c0) · wA − 1 + wB − c0 · (1− wA) + c0
)
,
which is equal to the slope of no signaling
∂uA
∂a0
= 1− wB − wA + c0 · (wA − wA).
Given the same end point and slope, country A’s expected payoff for the y-signal and no
signaling are the same.
With the w-signal (a2 < a0 ≤ a3), country A’s expected payoff is
uAw =
a0 − a3
a2 − a3 · (1−wB)+
a2 − a0
a2 − a3 ·
(
c0 · (1−wB)+(1−c0) · (a3 · (1−wB)+(1−a3) ·wA)
)
.
It holds that uAw(a2) = 1− wB. Country A’s expected payoff can be rearranged to read
uAw =
a2
a2 − a3 ·
(
c0 · (1−wB)+(1− c0) · (a3 · (1−wB)+(1−a3) ·wA)
)
− a3
a2 − a3 · (1−wB)
− 1
a2 − a3 ·
(
c0 · (1− wB) + (1− c0) · (a3 · (1− wB) + (1− a3) · wA)− (1− wB)
)
· a0.
The slope can be simplified to read
∂uAw
∂a0
= (1− c0) · (1− wA − wB),
which is equal to the slope of no signaling
∂uA∗
∂a0
= 1− wB − wA − c0 · (1− wB − wA).
Given the same starting point and slope, country A’s expected payoffs for the w-signal
and no signaling are the same.
Show that the y- and the w-signal provide higher expected payoffs for country B than no
signaling. With the y-signal (a0 > a3), country B’s expected payoff is
uBy =
1− a0
1− a3 ·
(
c0 · (wB) + (1− c0) · (a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB)
)
+
a0 − a3
1− a3 · wB.
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It holds that uBy(1) = wB. Country B’s expected payoff can be rearranged to read
uBy =
1
1− a3 ·
(
c0 · wB + (1− c0) · (a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB)− a3 · wB
)
− 1
1− a3 ·
(
c0 · wB + (1− c0) · (a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB)− wB
)
· a0.
The slope can be simplified to read
∂uBy
∂a0
= −wB + wB − (1− wB − wA) · c0,
which is smaller (and thus steeper, due to being negative) than the slope of no signaling
∂uB
∂a0
= −wB + wB.
With the w-signal (a2 < a0 ≤ a3), country B’s expected payoff is
uBw =
a0 − a3
a2 − a3 · wB +
a2 − a0
a2 − a3 ·
(
c0 · wB + (1− c0) · (a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB)
)
.
It holds that uBw(a2) = wB which is higher than the expected payoff without signaling
uB∗(a2) = wB − (1− c0) · (wB − wB) · a2.
It also holds that
uBw(a3) = c0 · wB + (1− c0) ·
(
a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB
)
,
which is the same as the expected payoff without signaling
uB∗(a3) = wB − (1− c0) · a3 · (wB − wB).
D Country B’s Preference for Signals
Country B prefers to send the z-signal over the y-signal, if the former’s expected payoff
exceeds the latter:
P (z) · wB + P (z) · wB ≥ P (y) ·
(
c0 · wB + (1− c0) · (a3 · wB + (1− a3) · wB)
)
+ P (y) · wB
⇒ a0 − 1
a2 − 1 ·wB+
a2 − a0
a2 − 1 ·wB ≥
a0 − 1
a3 − 1 ·
(
c0·wB+(1−c0)·(a3·wB+(1−a3)·wB)
)
+
a3 − a0
a3 − 1 ·wB
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⇒ a2 · (a3 − 1)
a2 − 1 · wB +
(1− a0) · (a3 − a2)
(a2 − 1) · (a0 − 1) · wB − a3 · wB ≥ c0 · a3 · (wB − wB)
⇒ a2 · (a3 − 1)
a2 − 1 · (wB − wB) ≥ c0 · a3 · (wB − wB)
⇒ c0 ≤ a2 · (a3 − 1)
a3 · (a2 − 1)
⇒ c0 ≤ 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA .
E Expected Payoffs with Bilateral Information Tran-
mission
Show that the v-signal provides higher expected payoffs to country A than no (and
unilateral) signaling. With the v-signal and a0 > a3, country A’s expected payoff is
uAv =
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·
(1− a0
1− a3 · (1− wB) +
a0 − a3
1− a3 · (1− wB)
)
+
1− c0
1− c1 ·
(1− a0
1− a2 · (1− wB) +
a0 − a2
1− a2 · (1− wB)
)
It holds that uAv(1) = 1− wB. The slope is
∂uAv
∂a0
= −1− c0
1− c1 ·
1
1− a2 · (wB − wB)−
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·
1
1− a3 · (wB − wB) > 0
⇒ 1− c0
1− c1 · (1− wB − wA) +
c0 − c1
1− c1 · (1− wB − wA)
⇒ 1− wB − 1− c0
1− c1 · wA −
c0 − c1
1− c1 · (wA),
which is smaller than the slope without signaling, as the following calculation shows:
∂uAv
∂a0
= 1− wB − 1− c0
1− c1 · wA −
c0 − c1
1− c1 · (wA) <
∂uA
∂a0
= 1− wB − wA + c0 · (wA − wA).
⇒ c0 − c1 < c0 · (1− c1)
⇒ c0 < 1,
which is true.
Given the same end point, it follows that bilateral information transmission provides
higher expected payoffs than no information transmission.
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With the v-signal and a2 < a0 ≤ a3, country A’s expected payoff is
uAv∗ =
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·
(1− a0
1− a2 · (1− wB) +
a0 − a2
1− a2 · (1− wB)
)
+
1− c0
1− c1 ·
(a3 − a0
a3 − a2 · (1− wB) +
a0 − a2
a3 − a2 · (1− wB)
)
.
It holds that uAv∗(a2) = 1− wB. The slope is
∂uAv∗
∂a0
= −1− c0
1− c1 ·
1
1− a2 · (wB − wB),
⇒ 1− c0
1− c1 · (1− wB − wA),
which is larger than the slope without signaling
∂uA∗
∂a0
= (1− c0) · (1− wB − wA).
Given the same starting point, it follows that bilateral signaling provides higher expected
payoffs to country A than no signaling.
Show that the v-signal provides higher expected payoffs to country B than no signaling
and the same expected payoffs as unilateral signaling. With the v-signal and a0 > a3,
country B’s expected payoff is
uBv =
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·
(1− a0
1− a3 · wB +
a0 − a3
1− a3 · wB
)
+
1− c0
1− c1 ·
(1− a0
1− a2 · wB +
a0 − a2
1− a2 · wB
)
It holds that uBv(1) = wB. The slope is
∂uBv
∂a0
= −1− c0
1− c1 ·
1
1− a2 · (wB − wB)−
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·
1
1− a3 · (wB − wB) < 0
⇒ ∂uBv
∂a0
= −(1− wB) + 1− c0
1− c1 · wA +
c0 − c1
1− c1 · wA,
which is smaller than the slope without signaling, as the following calculation shows:
∂uBv
∂a0
= −(1− wB) + 1− c0
1− c1 · wA +
c0 − c1
1− c1 · wA <
∂uB
∂a0
= −(wB − wB)
⇒ 1− c0
1− c1 · wA +
c0 − c1
1− c1 · wA < 1− wB,
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which is true.
Given the same end point, it follows that bilateral information transmission provides a
higher expected payoff to country B than no signaling. At the same time, the slope for
bilateral signaling is equal to the slope of unilateral signaling, as the following calculation
shows:
∂uBv
∂a0
= −(1−wB) + 1− c0
1− c1 ·wA +
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·wA =
∂uBy
∂a0
= −(1−wB −wA) · c0−wB +wB
⇒ c1 = 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA ,
which is true.
Thus, bilateral and unilateral information transmission provide the same expected pay-
offs to country B.
With the v-signal and a2 < a0 ≤ a3, country B’s expected payoff is
uBv∗ =
c0 − c1
1− c1 ·
(a3 − a0
a3 − a2 · wB +
a0 − a2
a3 − a2 · wB
)
+
1− c0
1− c1 ·
(1− a0
1− a2 · wB +
a0 − a2
1− a2 · wB
)
It holds that uBv∗(a2) = wB = uBw(a2) > uB∗(a2). Country B’s expected payoff can be
rearranged to read
uBv∗ =
1− c0
1− c1 · (1− wA) +
c0 − c1
1− c1 · wB −
1− c0
1− c1 · (1− wB − wA) · a0.
It holds that uBv∗(a3) = uB∗(a3)(= uBw(a3)), as the following calculation shows:
uBv∗(a3) =
1− c0
1− c1 · (1− wA) +
c0 − c1
1− c1 · wB −
1− c0
1− c1 · (1− wB − wA) · a3 >
uB∗(a3) = wB − (1− c0) · (wB − wB) · a3
⇒ (1− a3) · (1− wA − wB) > a3 · c1 · (wB − wB)
⇒ c1 = 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA ,
which is true.
Given the higher starting point and the same end point, it follows that bilateral infor-
mation transmission provides higher expected payoffs to country B than no information
transmission. Given the same starting and end point, the expected payoffs of bilateral
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and one-sided information transmission are the same.
F Optimal Posterior Beliefs
In the following, I show that the posterior beliefs for the z-, y-, w-, and v-signal, which
were so far assumed in the text, are optimal from the signaling state’s viewpoint.
The z-signal mixes between the posterior beliefs P (wB|z) = a2 and P (wB|z) = 1.
If, a), the change in belief through z is larger than previously assumed (left to a2), it
formally holds that P (wB|z) = a2−x with 0 < x ≤ a2. In this case, both types of country
A make a high offer, but this occurs with less frequency than with no deviation from the
originally assumed posterior belief as P (z) = 1−a0
1−a2+x is decreasing in x. Consequently,
country B’s expected payoff decreases with x, so that country B would like to maintain
the deviation as small as possible, preferably at 0. If, b), the change in belief through z
is smaller than previously assumed (right to a2), it formally holds that P (wB|z) = a2 +x
with 0 < x ≤ a3 − a2, and P (z) = 1−a01−a2−x . In this case, only one type of country A
(wA, threshold a3) makes a large offer, while the other type of country A (wA, threshold
a2) makes a small offer. Country B rejects the small offer and starts to fight a war if it
expects high war payoffs, which is the case with updated probability 1− (a2 + x). Thus,
country B expects high payoffs with probability P (z) · (c0 + (1 − c0) · (1 − (a2 + x))) =
1−a0
1−a2−x ·
(
c0 + (1− c0) · (1− a2 − x)
)
= 1−a0
1−a2−x · c0 + (1− a0) · (1− c0). This probability
of high payoffs is increasing in x up to the point that x = a3 − a2 so that P (wB|z) = a3,
whereby the probability of high payoffs is 1−a0
1−a3 · c0 + (1− a0) · (1− c0). Nonetheless, this
probability of high war payoffs is smaller than the probability of high payoffs without a
deviation, as the following calculation shows:
1− a0
1− a3 · c0 + (1− a0) · (1− c0) <
1− a0
1− a2
⇒ c0 < a2
1− a2 ·
1− a3
a3
⇒ c0 < 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA ,
which is true if we start out with the z-signal, as we did.
It follows that country B prefers a posterior belief of a2 over a posterior belief right to
a2. If, c), the change in belief through z is smaller than previously assumed (left to 1),
it formally holds that P (wB|z) = 1 − x with 0 < x ≤ 1 − a3, and P (z) = 1−a0−x1−a2−x . A
posterior belief P (wB|z) = 1− x implies a positive probability of high war payoffs if z is
sent. Thus, the overall probability of high payoffs is P (z) + P (z) · x = 1−a0−x·(1−a0+a2)
1−a2−x .
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This probability of high payoffs is decreasing in x up to the point that x = 0(+). Thus,
country B prefers a posterior belief of 1 over a posterior belief left to 1.
The y-signal mixes between the posterior beliefs P (wB|y) = a3 and P (wB|y) = 1. a) A
belief to the left of a3, P (wB|y) = a3−x with 0 < x ≤ a3−a2, corrsponds to a situation of
a belief to the right of a2 in case of the z-signal, which implies that the probability of high
payoffs is decreasing in x up to the point that P (wB|z) = a3. Thus, the deviation should
be kept as small as possible in order to maximize country B’s expected payoffs. b) A belief
to the right of a3, P (wB|y) = a3 + x with 0 < x ≤ a0 − a3, which implies P (y) = 1−a01−a3−x ,
induces none of the two types of A to make a high offer. Thus, the probability of high
payoffs is P (y) · (1 − a3 − x) = 1−a01−a3−x · (1 − a3 − x) = 1 − a0, which is equal to the
probability of high payoffs without information transmission. c) A belief to the left of 1,
P (wB|y) = 1 − x with 0 < x ≤ 1 − a0, implies P (y) = 1−a0−x1−a3−x and a probability of high
payoffs that is P (y)·(c0+(1−c0)·a3)+P (y)·x = 1−a0−x1−a3−x ·(c0+(1−c0)·(1−a3))+ a0−a31−a3−x ·x,
which is decreasing in x. Thus, from country B’s point of view, the deviation should be
kept as small as possible, preferably at zero.
The w-signal mixes between the posterior beliefs P (wB|w) = a2 and P (wB|w) = a3. a)
A belief to the left of a2, P (wB|w) = a2−x with 0 < x ≤ a2, implies that P (w) = a3−a0a3−a2+x ,
which is decreasing in x. Given that w yields higher expected payoffs for country B than
w, country B wants to keep a deviation from a2 as small as possible, preferably at zero.
b) A belief to the right of a2, P (wB|w) = a2 + x with 0 < x ≤ a0 − a2, implies that the
probability of high payoffs is P (w)·(c0+(1−c0)·(1−a2−x))+P (w)·(c0+(1−c0)·(1−a3)) =
a3−a0
a3−a2−x ·(c0+(1−c0)·(1−a2−x))+(1− a3−a0a3−a2−x)·(c0+(1−c0)·(1−a3)) = c0+(1−c0)·(1−a0),
which is the same probability of high payoffs as without information transmission, and
thus, the signaling surplus has vanished. c) A belief to the left of a3, P (wB|w) = a3 − x
with 0 < x ≤ a3 − a0, implies that P (w) = a3−a0−xa3−a2−x , which is decreasing in x. Given that
w yields higher expected payoffs than w, a lower probability of the former is not desirable
for country B. d) A belief to the right of a3, P (wB|w) = a3 +x with 0 < x ≤ 1−a3, yields
a probability of high payoffs that is P (w) +P (w) · (1− (a3 + x)) = 1− a0−a2a3−a2+x · (a3 + x).
This probability is increasing in x, but is lower than the probability of high payoffs with
the original version of the w-signal, as the following calculation shows (when assuming a
maximal deviation of x, which is 1− a3):
1− a0 − a2
a3 − a2 + (1− a3) · (a3 + (1− a3)) < P (w) + P (w) · (c0 + (1− c0) · (1− a3))
⇒ 1− a0 − a2
1− a2 · (1) < 1−
a0 − a2
a3 − a2 · (1− c0) · a3
⇒ 1
1− a2 >
a3
a3 − a2 · (1− c0)
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⇒ c0 > a2 · (1− a3)
a3 · (1− a2)
⇒ c0 > 1− wB − wA
1− wB − wA
which is true if we start out with the w-signal, as we did.
The v-signal mixes between the posterior beliefs P (wA|v) = c1 and P (wA|v) = 1. a) A
belief to the left of c1 implies that the z-signal is still played by country B, but less often,
as P (v) = 1−c0
1−c1+x is decreasing in x. As country A prefers v over v, this is disadvantageous
for country A. b) A belief to the right of c1 implies that the y- and w-signal is played
instead of the z-signal. The probability P (v) = 1−c0
1−c1−x is increasing in x, but at the
maximum value of x, which is c0−c1 and implies a posterior belief of c0 and P (v) = 1, the
expected payoff is the same as without information transmission. Thus, the additional
gains of information transmission have vanished. c) Finally, a belief to the left of 1,
P (wA|v) = 1 − x with 0 < x ≤ 1 − c0, implies that P (v) = c0−c11−c1−x . This probability
is increasing in x, but as country A prefers v over v, country A would like to keep the
deviation as small as possible.
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